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ABSTRACT 
 
Singapore’s regionalization stratagem led to the establishment of industrial parks in China, India 
and several South-East Asian countries. The strategic intent behind these overseas projects was two-
fold: exporting Singapore’s competencies such as management know-how, technological 
capabilities and corrupt-free administration to regions where such positive factors were lacking and 
secondly, exploiting comparative advantages that each region had to offer. This chapter revisits 
Singapore’s flagship projects in Indonesia and India. Evidence from on-site surveys and 
interviews are presented. This chapter contends that progress in these privileged investment 
zones remains stymied by particular dependencies and challenges in the host environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last four decades, Singapore, a city-state, has risen to be Southeast Asia’s premier 
world-city, as well as an important base for multinational manufacturing. Singapore’s reputation 
for corrupt-free administration and infrastructural efficiency, coupled with overall integrity of its 
legal and financial systems, have played a central role in attracting foreign direct investments to 
fuel the city-state’s economic development (Chia, 1986; Pang, 1987; Perry, 1995; Yeung, 2001). 
However, rising business costs – in the late 1970s and early 1980s - rendered it an imperative for 
Singapore’s economic planners to expand the island's investment horizons 1  and potential 
economic growth through an overseas direct investment program2. Singapore-based companies 
were goaded to form joint ventures with companies in North America and Europe, to accelerate 
access to new technology and foreign markets (Caplen and Ng, 1990; Balakrishnan, 1991; Ng & 
Wong, 1991). However, most of these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous 
losses by the early 1990s (Kanai, 1993; Regnier, 1993; Lee, 1994). 
 
A new phase in the internationalization strategy re-focused on expansion within Asia. The 
strategic repositioning was deliberated at the 1993 Regionalization Forum (Singapore Economic 
Development Board (SEDB), 1993a), and encapsulated in the policy document, Singapore 
Unlimited (1995a; 1995b).This stratagem was endorsed by the Committee to Promote Enterprise 
                                                 
1 Stoever (1985), Dunning (1988) and Porter (1990), among others, illustrate that a country’s relative level and composition of 
outward and inward investments are systematically related to its stage of development. Dunning’s (1988) investment development 
path model suggests that countries advance through five stages of development which relate to different levels of net outward 
investment. The thesis suggests that countries in the more advanced stages of development will have to increase their outward FDI 
in order to achieve greater economic growth. An extension of this thesis is revisited in Dunning and Narula (1996). 
 
2 The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (SEDB, 1988). The 1990 
Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
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Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993). The change from internationalization (or, in 
local parlance, outer globalization) to regionalization (inner globalization) was rationalized by 
the liberalization of foreign investment controls occurring at the time in countries like Indonesia, 
China and Vietnam, and the high growth rates these economies were achieving (SEDB, 1993b; 
1993c; Mahizhnan, 1994; Pang 1995; Kwok, 1995; Tan, 1995; Okposin, 1999; Pereira, 2001; 
Blomqvist, 2002; Sitathan, 2002). The marked increase in outward direct investments into the 
region is reflected in Table 1. 
 
Singapore’s trans-border industrialization initiatives comprised state-led3 infrastructure projects, 
and a range of incentives and regulatory innovations (Goh et al, 2001; Yeung, 2001), designed to 
create Singapore-styled industrial townships in regional sites where such positive factors may be 
lacking (Perry & Yeoh, 2000). A three-pronged ‘Singapore Inc’ approach was adopted (Zutshi 
and Gibbons, 1998): senior politicians and civil servants negotiated4 the institutional framework 
for the project, which typically involved garnering special investment conditions in the host 
location; (Singapore) government agencies and government-linked companies took the lead in 
infrastructure development; and Singapore’s Economic Development Board (SEDB) takes on the 
role of ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageur’ (SEDB, 1995a:42), by encouraging 
foreign multinationals to locate their regional headquarters in Singapore, whilst redistributing 
their lower-end operations to the Singapore-styled industrial parks.  
                                                 
3 The principles of government involvement are rationalized in the 1993 Report of the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas 
(chapter 4). For a scholarly discussion on the political economy of Singapore’s development strategy, see Rodan (1989), Regnier 
(1991), Ng, et al. (1992); Huff (1995); Low (1998) and Blomqvist (2001). There is also an extensive political-economy literature on 
Singapore’s regionalization program, succinctly summarized in Bellows (1995) and Yeung (1998). 
 
4 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practice preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas Chinese’ 
(Redding, 1990, Yeung, 1997; Brown, 1998; Lehmann, 1998), the ‘bamboo network’ which Singapore made use of in its industrial 
parks in Indonesia and China. Personal ties between Chairman, SEDB, and Ratan Tata (of the Tata Group) reportedly facilitated the 
move into India (Asian Review, 1996). 
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This strategic maneuver was premised on the perception that the redistribution of economic 
activities to regional industrial sites would enhance the collective competitiveness (or shakkei5) 
of Singapore-based companies, as well as Singapore’s own competitiveness as a high-value 
investment location with strategic linkages to the region (Figure 1). The strategic intent was for 
Singapore-based companies to tap into the markets, and resources, of regional economies. It was 
also intended to strengthen Singapore’s MNC-linkages through co-investment in the region 
(SEDB 1993a; 1993b; 1995a; 1995b).   
              
This chapter will focus, specifically, on the first overseas industrial township project, in Batam 
Island (Indonesia), and the most recent project, in Bangalore, India’s IT capital. To provide 
context to the discussion, the theoretical considerations underpinning these flagship projects are 
sketched in the next section, followed by an account of the origins and progress of the case study 
parks. The flagship projects are then evaluated in terms of the progress in attracting investment, 
the contributions to the strategic objectives associated with the park, as well as to Singapore’s 
broader regionalization initiative. The analysis is reinforced by empirical data from our on-site 
surveys of the Parks’ tenants, and in-depth case studies of selected tenants in both locations. The 
final section considers the implications of these experiences for Singapore’s regionalization 
program, and evaluates the city-state’s determined efforts to harness synergistic 
complementarities in its strategic intent to restructure the Singapore economy. 
 
                                                 
5 Shakkei’ is a Japanese landscaping strategy, where the scenery from one’s garden is enhanced by incorporating the 
scenery from afar, such that the combined scenery is superior to each on its own. Extrapolated, the collective 
competitiveness approach envisaged that the development of regional economies, and sites, leads to positive 
complementary growth for Singapore. 
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Prior to the 1960s, attempts to explain the activities of firms situated beyond their national 
boundaries represented an amalgamation of (i) the theory of (portfolio) capital movements (ii) 
empirical and largely country-specific studies on location factors influencing foreign direct 
investment (iii) modification to the neo-classical theories of trade, (iv) perceived gains of vertical 
or horizontal integration. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1970, 1980, 1988, 2001) sought to offer 
a general framework for determining the extent and activities of MNE engaged in cross-border 
value-adding activities. The eclectic paradigm was used to explain the ability and willingness of 
firms to serve markets, and to look into the reasons for their choice of exploiting this advantage 
through foreign production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio resource flows 
through the interaction of ownership-specific advantages, internalization-incentive advantages, 
and location-specific advantages (OLI). This theory has been extended, in more recent literature, 
to deliberations on the role of infrastructure in the attraction of new investments (Peck, 1996); 
the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-added activities (Markusen, 1996), 
the transactional benefits of spatial proximity (Porter, 1996) and the business-government nexus 
in alliance capitalism (Dunning 1995, 1997; 2000; Evans, 1995; Dunning and Narula, 1996, 
2000). 
 
Not all advantages provided by the triumvirate of OLI will be evenly distributed across 
enterprises, industries and countries. These advantages are not static and may affect a firm’s 
strategic response to any particular OLI configuration. Firms excogitate the O advantages 
through exploitation of firm-specific resources, simultaneously deriving I advantages through the 
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diminution of transaction costs. As firms’ core competencies become increasingly knowledge-
intensive, MNEs seek locations (economic and institutional facilities) that are best utilizing their 
core competencies. In determining the propitious extent in which a firm strategically locates, we 
will examine, inter alia, Singapore’s trans-border industrialization efforts, with particular focus 
on the regionalization of Singapore-based firms, and if the locations of these townships are 
indeed that strategically advantageous. A survey questionnaire, adapted from Yeoh, et al (2000), 
is applied to the tenants in the case-study parks.  
 
Theories, from the perspective of the firm, have further argued that not only should the 
production process be viewed as a value chain (Kogut, 1985; Porter, 1986, 1994, 1996), but also, 
firms should identify comparative or location-specific advantages unique to each 
country/territory, which will serve to complement the competitive advantage they enjoy as a 
result of being placed higher up in the value chain. Additionally, in the face of globalization, the 
location-specific advantages need to be altered to suit the increasing spatial integration of 
complex and rapidly changing economic activities and to also consider the role of national and 
regional authorities in their influence over the extent and structure of localized centers of 
excellence. Thus, a holistic approach must be adopted that takes into consideration firm-oriented 
competitive advantages as well as comparative advantages offered by regions. Synergistic efforts 
will occur when a strategic fit between the competitive and comparative advantages exist. To 
address this aspect of our research, we will present case studies of eight firms located in the case-
study parks to draw out empirical insights on the dynamics of the case-study parks as centers for 
value-added activities, inter alia, the strategic fit between the value-added chain of the firms and 
the competitive advantages of the sites. 
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SINGAPORE’S OVERSEAS INDUSTRIAL PARKS 
 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Indonesia 
The late 1960s witnessed Indonesia’s ambition to develop the Riau islands when Batam was 
identified as a potential logistics and operational base to support offshore oil and gas fields. The 
first master plan for Batam was prepared by Nissho-Iwai, a Japanese consultancy firm, and 
Bechtel of the United States. The study was commissioned by the Indonesian state-owned oil 
company, Pertamina, to develop the island into a base for oil and gas exploration activities. The 
original master plan was reviewed by the American consultants CRUX in 1977. This study 
recommended guidelines for a more broad-based development of the island A significant step in 
the island’s development was the assignment of Batam’s development responsibility to the 
Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) in 1978. BIDA’s chairman, B.J. Habibie, 
favored attempts to engineer accelerated technological breakthroughs based on state-directed 
investment. This was reflected in the 1979 master plan, which focused on the development of 
transhipment facilities, the establishment of industrial estates, the development of marshalling 
areas for imports and exports, the construction of tourist facilities and the provision of 
infrastructural support. This master plan recognized that the Riau islands with its location-
specific advantages such as abundant land cheap labor were well-positioned 6  to address 
Singapore’s land and labor constraints and, more importantly, to take advantage of Singapore's 
established business and financial services network and the city-state's efficient facilities for 
                                                 
6 The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon Indonesia's economic planners the need for a more broad-
based development strategy. The Riau islands were an obvious choice to encourage investments not least because Singapore has 
shown interest in leasing these nearby islands to transcend the city-state's need for inexpensive land and labor. By the late 1980s, the 
perception from Jakarta was that Singapore was "bursting at the seams", and that the time was right to position Batam and the other 
Riau islands to take advantage of the spill-over from Singapore. 
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communication, transportation and other services (Liew, 1990; Yeoh, 1990; Regnier, 1991; Perry, 
1991; Parsonage, 1992; Ho, 1994). A Memorandum of Understanding on bilateral cooperation in 
the development of Riau Province was signed on August 29, 1990. 
 
BIP was launched in 1992. The Park started as a joint-venture between Singapore’s GLCs7 and 
the Salim Group of Indonesia. Salim was Indonesia’s largest business conglomerate, and had 
close links to senior politicians and privileged access to the major investment projects in the Riau 
Islands (Sato, 1993; Hill, 1996). Singaporean GLCs were given control over the development 
and management of the Parks, while Salim’s role was to facilitate operations and to provide a 
guarantee of priority over regulatory controls and administrative approvals. Singapore’s 
reputation for transparent and efficient management of projects lent further credibility to the 
projects and maximized marketing leverage over Singapore-based multinationals (Yeoh, et al; 
1992; Naidu, 1994; Peachey et al, 1998; Grundy-Warr, 1999). 
 
BIP was envisaged as a self-contained environment with its communication and business 
linkages through Singapore rather than through Indonesia. BIP, for instance, has its own power 
supply, water treatment plant, sewerage system, telecommunications facilities and social 
amenities. These, together with the location advantages that Indonesia offers, has resulted in an 
investment enclave offering facilities close to conditions in Singapore, in marked contrast to the 
conditions immediate outside the Parks.  
 
                                                 
7 The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) and Jurong 
Town Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer. 
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BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and Japanese multinationals 
already operating in Singapore. Cumulative investments and export value in BIP topped 
US$1billion and US$2 billion in 2002 respectively, and the number of confirmed tenants 
increased from 17 in 1991 to 82 in 2003. Of these, 39 were Japanese companies with Singapore-
owned companies the next largest concentration at 25. American and European investors have a 
limited presence. There is a concentration of electronics operations, mainly various component 
assembly processes, and supporting activities to the electronics sector such as plastic moulding 
and packaging. Out of total employment of 65,000, over 85% are female, most aged from 18-22. 
Table 2A shows the operational statistics in BIP, while Table 2B shows the tenant profile by 
origin and Table 2C, the tenant profile by sector. 
 
International Tech Park Limited (ITPL), Bangalore, India 
The idea to create a Singapore style park was first mooted by Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong and India’s Premier, P.V. Narasimha Rao, in 1992. Construction commenced in 
September 1994, and the park was officially inaugurated in 2000. ITPL is located 18km away 
from Bangalore in India’s Silicon Valley8. The partners in the ITPL project are a Singapore 
consortium of companies9 led by Ascendas International, the Tata Group and the Karnataka state 
government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The Karnataka state government has since reduced its 
stake to 6 percent, while the Singapore consortium, and the Tata Group have increased their 
respective stakes to 47 percent each. 
                                                 
8 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore has been a ‘hunting 
ground’ for Singapore companies and Singapore-based multinationals seeking low-cost IT specialists. 
 
9 The Singapore consortium, Information Technology Park Investments Pte Ltd,  includes RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers, 
L&M Properties, Sembawang Industrial, Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) and Parameswara Holdings (the 
investment arm of the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce). 
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Marketed aggressively as an environment that “cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are 
a part of India’s infrastructure and operating environment”10, ITPL was slated to provide total 
business space solutions to multinationals and other conglomerates, within a state-of-the-art 
technology park. More distinctively, ITPL guarantees uninterrupted power supply and 
telecommunication facilities, immediate-occupancy business incubator space, and the formulaic 
‘one-stop’ service. Its futuristic design comes complete with value added services like 
business/office support centers, medical center, food court, restaurants, recreational centers. 
ITPL also houses the Indian Institute of Information Technology, which provides professional 
and skilled manpower for the Park’s tenants. Operating profits have been registered, and ITPL is 
projected to break even within the next 4 years.     
 
The blend of location-specific advantages such as technology and infrastructure on one hand, and 
competitive skilled labor on the other led to high value added activities taking place at ITPL. 
ITPL’s earliest clients included SAP Labs, First Ring and 24/7. As at January 2003, there are 100 
confirmed tenants, of which 93 are operational with 8500 employees. More than half of these 
tenants are represented by wholly or partially foreign-owned firms which include some well 
known global players like AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Sony, Texas Instruments, Citicorp and 
Thomas Cook. The industries there include Software development, Business Process 
Outsourcing and Manufacturing.  
 
                                                 
10 The Straits Times, August 8, 1999 
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Both BIP and ITPL reflect an “industry cluster” strategy. In BIP, this cluster is that of a 
concentration of electronic firms (50%) while ITPL reflects a concentration of software and e-
service based firms (70%). However the difference is that while 91% of firms in BIP are engaged 
in manufacturing activity, the corresponding percentage in its counterpart, ITPL is only 10%. 
Table 3A presents ITPL’s operational statistics, Table 3B shows the tenant profile by country of 
origin and Table 3C, the tenant profile by sector. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Prior analyses on the Parks have relied primarily on secondary data from official publications, 
press reports, etc. To obtain primary data on the differential impact of various pull factors on 
firms’ investment decisions, along with the differential impact of different types of constraints on 
their operations, we surveyed the tenants in ITPL in December 2002 and June 2003, and for BIP, 
in July 2003. The first set of questions sought to determine the profile of the respondents: type of 
ownership, nature of operations and size of establishment; and the second set was structured to 
gather information on the push-pull affecting the investment decisions of the tenants. Other 
questions pertaining to the respondents’ views on the facilities and services in the Parks were 
culled from the open-ended questions. A total of 60 responses were collected from the two 
Singapore-styled investment enclaves.  
 
Questionnaire Survey 
Profile of the respondents 
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There were 27 respondents in the BIP survey, of which 7 were wholly Singapore-owned, 5 were 
Singaporean joint ventures, and 15 were wholly foreign-owned. The respondents were mainly 
involved in the manufacturing of intermediate products. 7 of the respondents were involved in 
the manufacture of consumer products, and another 5 were providers of industrial services. There 
were 7 respondents with a sales turnovers of less than US$5 million, 14 respondents with 
turnovers between US$5 million and US$50 million, and the remaining had turnovers exceeding 
US$50 million. 
 
Of the 33 respondents from ITPL, 4 were wholly Singapore-owned, 6 were joint venture and 23 
were wholly foreign-owned. As for the nature of operations, 16 of the respondents were involved 
in software development, 4 were involved in support services and 2 in research and development. 
15 respondents had a sales turnover less than US$5 million and 4 respondents had sales between 
US$5 million and US$50 million. 
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses related to 
factors and constraints, logit analysis was used to compare the push/pull factors influencing the 
tenants’ decision to locate in the Parks. The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, 
takes the following form: 
                                                   Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
where:  Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
            exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
    Zi is a linear function of the push/pull factors defined as   
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    i = 6 
 Zi = α0 + ∑ αi Fi 
  i = 1 
 
where:   F1 = 1 if “Political commitment from the Singapore government” is selected, 0 otherwise  
       F2 = 1 if “Political commitment from the host country government” is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F3 = 1 if “Investment incentives” is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F4 = 1 if “Competitive labor costs” is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F5 = 1 if “Reliable infrastructure facilities” is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F6 = 1 if “Access to domestic market” is selected, 0 otherwise 
       α0 = constant term 
                    αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant (as indicated by the p-values), 
would suggest that the firm choosing that particular push/pull factor is more likely to be from 
BIP than from ITPL. A similar logit model was applied to the constraints faced by the Parks’ 
tenants: 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
 
 where:    Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
                exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
       Zi is a linear function of the constraints defined as  
    i = n 
 Zi = β0 + ∑ β i Ci 
  i = 1 
where:  Ci (1 to n, depending on the type of constraint) = 1 if constraint i is selected, 0 
otherwise  
      β 0 = constant term 
                  β i = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
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In this case, estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest 
that the firm choosing that particular constraint is more likely to be from BIP than from ITPL.  
 
Analyses and findings 
Factors influencing respondents’ decision to invest in BIP/ITPL (Table 4) 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the location-specific 
advantages available in the host environments to market its industrial parks. It supplements these 
purported advantages with its political commitment to the Parks, as demonstrated by the many 
bilateral agreements between the GLCs and host governments, or politically-linked business 
conglomerates, and a host of investment incentives to entice multinationals to locate their 
activities to these self-contained enclaves.  
 
However, while BIP offered businesses cheap labor for their low value added activities, ITPL, 
with its skilled as well as cheap manpower, could facilitate activities higher up the value chain. 
Not unexpected, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was the main draw of 
both BIP and ITPL. 85% and 82% of BIP and ITPL tenants surveyed cited it as the main pull 
factor for them to locate in the Park.  
 
Competitive labor costs is a major pull factor for BIP tenants compared to ITPL tenants, as 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant α4 (= 4.274). This is expected since BIP 
serves as a low-cost investment enclave, and a large proportion (71%) of the tenants in BIP 
engage in manufacturing activities. Manufacturing being labor intensive inherently requires low-
cost labor. ITPL tenants, while valuing cheap labor as well, do not require it in the sheer amounts 
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that manufacturing demands. 82% of ITPL survey respondents had less than 50 employees, 
while 52% of BIP respondents employed more than 500 people. Hence ‘competitive labor costs’ 
was a significant pull factor in the case of BIP compared to ITPL. 
 
Political commitment from the host government is another major concern for BIP tenants 
compared to ITPL tenants, indicated by the positive and statistically significant α2 (=1.992). This 
can be explained by the instability of Indonesia’s political system. Since Soeharto was made to 
step down in 1998, the presidential position has changed hands several times, from Habibie, to 
the first democratically-elected President, Abdurrahman Wahid, and finally Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, on her predecessor’s impeachment.  Key economic positions were reshuffled and 
economic advisors changed frequently, as power jockeying among the parties, ministries, 
legislature, central bank, and other institutions continued. All these served to complicate 
investors’ assessment of Indonesia’s political outlook. 
 
Constraints on respondents' operations in BIP/ITPL (Table 5) 
BIP is now an established industrial estate development. ITPL is relatively new. All the same, 
our study alludes to some emerging constraints which have undermined the attractiveness of the 
Parks. These constraints are categorised into three broad groups: labor-related constraints, 
organization and technology-related constraints, and those relating to the economic 
“environment”, such as government policies and regulations. 
 
Labor-related constraints 
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The ‘cheap’ labor resources which drew companies to BIP proved to be a perception rather than 
the reality, as “rising labor costs” was the main constraint faced by 21 (78%) of the BIP tenants 
surveyed. BIP tenants also found rising labor costs to be more of a concern than ITPL tenants as 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant β 3 (= 2.283). Other labor constraints 
experienced by BIP tenants (but less so by ITPL tenants) include shortage of semi-skilled and 
skilled labor and industrial relations problems as indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant β1 (=2.770) and β4 (= 3.330). In fact, industrial relations problems were frequently 
cited as being very disruptive to the operations of the tenants in BIP, as workers unhappy with 
labor laws often use pressure tactics such as strikes, demonstrations and work-to-rule. 
 
Organizational and technological-related constraints 
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, as 
facilities such as the power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply are independently 
managed. This resulted in high overhead costs, especially in BIP where 74% of respondents cited 
it as a constraint they faced. This view was also echoed by 16 (48%) of ITPL tenants surveyed. 
Other organizational/ technological constraints faced by BIP tenants (but not as much by ITPL 
tenants) include the lack of good supporting services (β3 = 2.504) and difficulty in introducing 
new technology and techniques (β2 = 2.541), both of which are positive and significant. 
 
`Environmental’ constraints 
‘Impact of host government regulations’ and ‘competition from overseas industry competitors’ 
were constraints faced by both BIP and ITPL tenants. However, whereas 89% and 78% of BIP 
tenants cited the above two constraints respectively, less than one third of the ITPL tenants 
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indicated likewise. This accounts for the positive and statistically significant β1 (=2.312) and β2 
(=2.920). The government’s control over the operating environment and the economic landscape 
shaped by overseas industry competitors prove to be stifling the operations of the tenants in BIP 
more than that of tenants in ITPL. 
 
Case Studies (The first four companies are in BIP) 
Company A (Electronics) 
Company A is part of a US-based conglomerate, which operates in all 50 US states as well as 
over 100 countries throughout the world. The group as a whole manufactures critical 
infrastructure components, catering to diversified needs of businesses and governments, 
educational and medical institutions, and commercial industries from food to automobiles. The 
subsidiary in Batam is under the electronics arm of the conglomerate. The latter is a major 
producer of passive and active electronic components, such as complete power systems, private 
radio systems for governments, and undersea fiber optic telecommunications systems. 
 
The existing Batam operations started in 1992, but belonged to a competitor German electronics 
components manufacturer, which located to BIP to take advantage of the stable infrastructure 
and low labor costs. In October 2000, Company A acquired its rival and took over all its 
manufacturing operations, including the facility in BIP. It has since become a leading maker of 
passive electronic components such as automotive relays and connectors. The BIP operations 
currently employ 560 workers and occupy 4,500 square meters. The company sources its inputs 
from around the world, and the facility in BIP is mainly for production. The final products are 
shipped to the US, Australia and some parts of ASEAN.  
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The company praises the one-stop service provided by the park’s management, citing the 
efficient and transparent administration as a boon to its operations, by providing a more stable 
operating environment. However, being primarily labor-intensive, the company is feeling the 
impact of the rising labor and overhead costs on its operations. Specifically, it would like to see 
more efforts made to lower the operating overheads, such as having variable electricity rates.  
 
Despite facing the uncertain political climate and the heightened terrorism threat, the company 
has intentions to expand its current operations within BIP, the key reason being that moving to 
other locations would be cost-prohibitive, given the huge amount of costs the company has sunk 
into its BIP operations. 
 
Company B (Crystal oscillators) 
Company B is a 100% owned Japanese firm which disburses in the production of crystal 
oscillators. Its various plants have been strategically positioned in diverse countries such as 
Thailand, Vietnam, USA and China. Occupying a massive space of 6,000 square meters of land, 
serviced by a workforce of 432 employees, the company manufactures about 100 various types 
of oscillators to be used in an array of products, from clocks to TGX (Mobiles). Operations and 
outbound logistics are administered mainly in Batam, with the parent base in Japan engaged in 
the development of new technology.  
 
In 1997, economical prices on rent, utilities and labor enticed the company to invest in the 
Industrial Park. In surmising to locate in Batam, the company’s production manager reminisce 
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the lack of utilities in India, and BIP’s competitive operational cost as compared to Thailand. 
Further inquiries revealed several perceived strengths that compensated the inherent weaknesses, 
which inveigle the company to remain. Strengths include the availability of utilities, provision of 
medical services and the proffer of legal documentation; poor traffic conditions, paranoia caused 
by SARS and banned IDD calls due to Telecom’s monopoly were constituents of perceived 
constraints. 
 
The company suffered losses for the fiscal year 2001-2, considering Sept 11 economy downturn 
and the region’s instability, which further pushed down investors’ confidence. Volatile mobile 
phone market, coupled with economic uncertainty has forced the company to reassess its 
investment in BIP. In a bid to maintain its cost competitiveness, the company aims to streamline 
its production processes, and employ advanced technology. It remains optimistic of a potential 
buoyant economy, fueled by the reduction of leading economies’ interest rates in a bid to spur 
consumer spending, which bodes well for its overseas markets.  
 
Company C (Electronic switches) 
A joint venture between Singapore and Switzerland, Company C is an electronics contract 
manufacturer involved in printed circuit board assembly and box-build assembly. Many of its 
products, such as refrigerator switches, are used in industry as intermediate products. While USA 
was the primary market for the company’s products, the events following September 11 has dealt 
a severe blow to demand for its products, and has led the company to restructure and diversify its 
markets to Europe and elsewhere in Asia. The BIP operations employs about 200 workers, and 
occupies one medium-sized factory. All its products are exported out of Indonesia. 
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The company cites the competitive costs of unskilled labor and overheads, and political 
commitment and incentives from the Indonesian government as pull factors which drew it to BIP. 
In particular, it singled out the reliable infrastructure as the park’s greatest strength. It was also 
quite satisfied with the one-stop service provided by the park. 
 
Granted, labor may be cheaper, but the company felt that productivity was lacking and its 
operations were often disrupted by industrial relations problems. There were many loopholes in 
labor laws which were exploited by the unions and employees. The higher overhead costs were 
also a concern. Though the one-stop service was commendable, the company still felt stifled by 
red tape as new technologies could not be easily imported. 
 
The recent Bali bomb blasts did not have any effect on the company’s plans for its Batam 
operations. Its operations decisions are based on demand factors outside of Indonesia. The 
company has plans to expand within BIP, considering the expected pick-up in demand after the 
current economic downturn. 
 
Company D (Adhesives) 
Company D is a manufacturer of a diverse range of adhesives for both domestic and industrial 
usage. It is also involved in the manufacture of the aluminum packaging for its adhesive products. 
The company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Singapore-based company, which in turn is 
affiliated to a larger Japanese conglomerate. 
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The manufacturing facility in BIP was set up in 1996, and involved the shifting of all activities 
purely related to manufacturing from Singapore, where labor costs were eroding their 
profitability. In this sense, the factory in BIP operates as an independent cost centre. All inputs 
for its operations are imported through Singapore. The company does not have a license to 
export its products, so it has to ship all final products back to Singapore for re-export. Thus, it is 
a purely export-oriented facility. It currently employs 150 workers and occupies 2 medium-sized 
factories. 
 
Although the management acknowledges the reliable and stable infrastructure, it is generally 
displeased with the high cost of utilities, and feels that the premium charged is excessive 
compared to the benefits obtained from such basic necessities. They revealed that water and 
electricity were charged in Singapore dollar, rather than the Indonesian rupiah, and were in fact 
more expensive than in Singapore.  
 
Another major complaint was labor. Labor costs were lower in BIP, but there had been many 
industrial disputes which caused much uncertainty to its operations and strained relations 
between the company and its workers. Unions, both registered and unregistered, wield 
considerable power in negotiations and even a short disruption to the company’s operations 
could have a significant impact on the company’s production schedule. Moreover, although labor 
costs were low, absenteeism was high and the local workers generally had poor work ethics. 
Labor laws were also deemed to be too protective towards workers. These laws were made 
known to the company only after it had established its operations. To alleviate these labor 
problems, the company tends to hire on a short term contract basis. While the problems it faced 
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are significant, the company has no plans to relocate out of BIP. Neither does it have any plans to 
expand, or scale down its operations in BIP. 
 
Case E (Inter-enterprise software) 
Company E is a wholly-owned subsidiary of an international software giant. Its German parent is 
recognized as the world leader in providing collaborative business solutions for all types of 
industries and major markets, and enjoys the position of being the world’s largest inter-enterprise 
software company, and the world’s third largest independent software supplier overall. The 
parent company also employs 28,800 people in over 50 countries. 
 
Company E was initially a German IT company, operating in Bangalore’s Koramangala district. 
It was taken over in 1998, a move that was accompanied by a shift into ITPL. With actual 
operations within ITPL beginning only in 1997, the company’s establishment in 1998 made it 
one of the first occupiers. It also boasts of being the park’s largest tenant, in terms of space 
occupancy, covering about 9,000 m2. The company initially had a choice of relocating itself at 
ITPL or at other city locations, which offered one-fourth the rent. The company chose ITPL, 
despite its higher rents, largely due to the following critical advantages that ITPL provided: 
uninterrupted power supply, state-of the-art infrastructure, ease and speed of setting up shop, and 
excellent communication channels. In justifying the company’s relocation into ITPL, a company 
official had this to say: “For any company, ITPL provides excellent operating facilities, which 
brings about an increase in revenue. This increase in revenue is larger than the increase in costs 
(in terms of rent)”. The company’s primary operation within the park is confined to software 
development, and is described as a “100% export unit”. All its exports go to Germany. 
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The company, after having completed fours years in the park, has decided to move out. The 
principal reason given for this is the rapid growth of the firm. In the four years since its inception, 
it has grown from a little over 70 employees to 500 employees today. Space constraints within 
the park have forced the company to look at other locations. ITPL has been unable to cater to the 
growing and irregular needs of the company, being a park suited for small and medium 
enterprises. As a fast expanding company, the company no longer views ITPL’s costly rents as 
one that can be justified. Instead, the company has moved into an expansive new campus, 15 
acres in area, where it can enjoy economies of scale. Furthermore, the company views such a 
shift as an opportunity to establish its own identity, which it had not fully experienced in a multi-
tenanted place like ITPL. However, given ITPL’s ‘distinct’ advantages, the company has not 
fully relocated. Instead it continues to retain office space in the Park’s new BTS (Built-To-Suit) 
facilities. 
 
Case F (Business process outsourcing) 
Company F is an American-based firm undertaking e-services. It is known to provide the 
industry standard in customer support services and solutions to Global 500 companies. It was 
founded by an experienced management team with proven expertise in delivering large-scale, 
mission-critical customer support programs, with its corporate headquarters in Los Gatos, 
California, and operations at the ITPL, Bangalore. 
 
ITPL, with its facilities best suited for small and medium enterprises engaged largely in R&D 
and in the service industry, has become a breeding ground, of sorts, for companies involved in 
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Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Located at the ‘Creator’ building of ITPL, company F is 
one of many such companies. Established in the park in April 2000, the company has over 800 
employees, occupying 60,000 square feet. 
 
Its key operations in the park include call centers, real-time customer service management and 
technical support to foreign firms. In fact, the facility in ITPL is the largest call centre in the state 
of Karnataka. Catering to customers as big as Alta Vista, the company has conducted successful 
programs such as outbound telemarketing, inbound phone customer service, inbound phone 
technical service, with service areas spanning countries worldwide, particularly, U.S and Europe. 
 
Involved in email and telephone-based customer services targeted at customers all round the 
world, the company, like all others concerned with BPO operations, requires a facility that will 
provide the necessary round-the-clock resources. ITPL successfully makes available the same. 
The regular power supply, the 24-hour speedy connectivity and the plug and play services of 
ITPL have proven to be the distinguishing factors in luring the company. An added advantage is 
seen in the fact that the city of Bangalore abounds with excellent schools and universities. This 
coupled with the high standard of education, serves as a continuous source of skilled 
employment for the call centers located in the park. The company sees this pool of potential 
employees as an added advantage in carrying out its operations in ITPL. 
 
Case G (Business process outsourcing) 
Company G is a wholly American owned firm, with its parent company being considered a 
frontrunner in integrating the expanding capabilities of information technology, 
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telecommunications and the internet. The parent company has its headquarters in Virginia, U.S.A. 
Its services include voice-based services, internet services, back-office functions, and interactive 
tele-services. Company G was incorporated in May 1999 as a 100% subsidiary. Its facility within 
the park spreads over 42,000 square feet and employs 12,000 employees. The company’s 
functions within the park largely focus on Business Process Outsourcing, which include both 
inbound and outbound customer care. 
 
As in the case of other companies in the same industry, Company G, too, cites the permanent 
power supply, 24-hour connectivity and supporting infrastructure as the vital factors that 
prompted it to situate in the park. The company also employs a sizeable portion of the IT 
graduates that Bangalore churns out every year. In addition to the above, according to a company 
official, the firm perceives ITPL’s excellent and professional support services and maintenance 
programs as a huge advantage that gives it an added edge over its peers that are located 
elsewhere. Such benefits have been the direct result of the Singaporean-styled management. 
However, the company has expressed reservation over the numerous other call centers making 
their way into ITPL to make use of the same advantages, which escalates into other problems 
such as heightened competition, further sharing of resources, and the “the pool of entry level 
people getting smaller”. 
 
Case H (Travel and financial services) 
Company H is one of the world's leading international travel and financial services groups and 
serves over 20 million customers a year. It provides services at 4,500 locations in more than 100 
countries and employs over 20,000 people. Establishing itself in India as early as in 1881, today, 
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the company’s Indian subsidiary has a network of 54 locations in 16 cities across India and is the 
largest travel and financial services group in the country. Foreign exchange, corporate travel, 
leisure holidays, travel insurance and credit cards form the core activities of the company. 
 
Company H is one of the very few companies that were approached by the ITPL management 
itself to set up shop at the park. On the management’s behest, the company acquired an office 
within the park’s premises largely to provide money-changing activity. Its core operations within 
the park, therefore, include ticketing and foreign exchange services. Company H is a small entity 
with only 5 employees. However, it has managed to secure a large customer base largely due to 
the fact that it is the only tenant providing such services within the park. Moreover, the company 
also caters to an increasing number of firms outside the park who find it convenient to visit its 
office in the park, which is in close proximity, instead of approaching its other branches placed 
in the city-center. 
 
Discussion 
Our in-depth case studies substantiate the survey results. For BIP, lower labor cost and greater 
availability of labor compared to Singapore were key elements in their decision to locate some of 
their production operations in Batam. Managers we interviewed cited labor cost and labor 
availability as primary reasons for relocation of labor-intensive operations, within the value chain, to 
Batam. However, all companies found infrastructure costs such as transport relatively 
uncompetitive, despite the institutional and infrastructural framework put in place in BIP. 
Nevertheless, each of the four companies believed that the savings in labor costs allowed them to 
capture competitive advantage in operations. However, these companies did not capture competitive 
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advantage in the labor chain solely through reduced labor costs. Another, albeit related element of 
the functional differentiation is that, the relocation of labor-intensive operations to Batam is coupled 
with lower investments and therefore greater savings in production technology. This was due to a 
variety of factors: the difficulty in automating those processes; the use of low-cost labor as an 
alternative to investments in technology; the low skill of the labor force; the maintenance and 
upgrading of the more automated operations in Singapore. In this sense, the functional and spatial 
differentiation of the value chain segment `operations’ was used by those companies having 
production operations both in Singapore and in Batam to reduce costs both in terms of labor and in 
technology investment. Investment in high technology was reserved for operations in Singapore. In 
short, the search for cost advantages has led to a spatial fragmentation of the production process, 
and MNCs breaking their value-added chains across national borders to maximise the competitive 
advantages of the contiguous economies.  
 
The tenants at ITPL pose a stark contrast to those in BIP, which has managed to attract a 
significant majority of their tenants on the basis of abundant low-cost, low-skilled labor. The 
scenario in ITPL is decidedly different. Our study suggests that the same advantage of plentiful 
labor, and competitive labor costs, has not been the sole influencing factor in attracting firms to 
the park. The primary reason, which has encouraged firms to settle in the park, has been that of 
excellent infrastructural facilities and the Singapore-styled management characterized by its 
quintessential efficiency. Anecdotal evidence from our case studies suggests that international IT 
firms have relocated to ITPL from other locations for this reason. ITPL represents a modified 
version of the Porter-Kogut analytical framework, whereupon ITPL has witnessed the location of 
firms engaged in marketing and sales, and other services (viz, the primary activities), which were 
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supported by other activities such as technological development and infrastructure within the 
park (viz, the secondary activities), sufficiently provided by the Singapore partner. A case in 
point is the rapid establishment of companies in the BPO industry, and the myriad of e-services, 
including telemarketing and customer sales services, by simply making utmost use of the 
telecommunication facilities that the park showcased, as substantiated by our case studies. This, 
along with the advanced technology made available at ITPL, has helped make the park the 
cynosure of companies engaged in the non-manufacturing industries, that is, those placed in the 
higher end of the value chain.   
 
To a large extent, the case-study parks have succeeded in providing the crucial links within the 
value-added chain that give client firms a competitive advantage. The problem lies on the flip 
side of the desired strategic fit – the host country’s ability to provide comparative advantages. In 
both scenarios, the host government has succeeded only in making available the advantages of 
‘basic factors of production’. Thus, while the case-study parks do provide some components of 
comparative advantage which the host country does not (e.g. reliable infrastructure), the strategic 
intent of these flagship projects remains stymied by non-economic, socio-political complexities 
in the larger host environment. 
 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
The special privileges secured by Singapore’s overseas industrial township projects share a 
common trait: many of the privileges obtained were unprecedented, and unique, to the case-study 
parks. For instance, the Singapore partners were granted licenses to build and operate their own 
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power and water treatment plants and telecommunication facilities which, in Indonesia and India, 
was an exclusive concession. As such, the Parks could leverage on their reputation of reliable 
infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities were an anomaly. Moreover, since local 
government officials were usually part of the management boards of the parks, once bureaucratic 
procedures, such as investment approvals, construction activities, import/export permits and 
immigration matters became accelerated processes. The Parks serve to attract investors with its 
formulaic one-stop service within a self-sufficient, self-contained environment which is 
unburdened by inefficient administration. Significantly, Singapore’s positive reputation with 
multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-free investment environment lends credibility, 
such that it seems privileged to be located in the Parks11. 
 
Influence can also be exerted through inter-governmental interaction and, where existing, 
through the links to influential ethnic business groups in the investment location who often rely 
on state patronage for their access to infrastructure development projects. The main Singapore 
partners involved in these projects were government-linked companies (notably, SembCorp 
Industries, Keppel Corp and Ascendas International), and Temasek Holdings (the Singapore 
government’s main investment holding company). For the Indonesian parks, the main local 
partner was the Salim Group, which, albeit private, is nevertheless well known for its close links 
to senior Indonesian politicians and privileged access to major investment projects. ITPL also 
shares the characteristic of strong government involvement, with the Indian counterparts being 
the Karnataka state government and the Tata Group, which, though private, is nonetheless well 
connected with local authorities. The strategic alliances between Singapore’s own state-owned 
                                                 
11 This was a constant refrain throughout our interviews in ITPL. 
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enterprise networks, and its counterparts in the regional sites, were instrumental in mobilizing 
the financial resources to complete these multi-million projects and, in most cases, within a 
comparatively short time-frame of 18 to 24 months.  
 
Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically `engineered’, inter-government 
endorsement of the flagship projects, and the enormous resources mobilized through the strategic 
partnerships, have `failed’ to shield the Parks from a gamut of problems. Issues pertaining to the 
scale and character of development of BIP, viz, BIP’s resemblance to a Japanese investment 
enclave and vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments, and infrastructural dilemmas, 
as well as the limited impact of the Indonesia parks on the transfer of low value operations from 
Singapore, and the associated upgrading of linked activities in Singapore, are discussed in 
Peachey et al (1998), Grundy-Warr et al (1999) and Yeoh et al (forthcoming). Peachey et al 
(1998) have drawn attention to the influx of immigrants to the islands and, concomitantly, to the 
social problems of squatter settlements which threaten to overwhelm the investment value of the 
Indonesian parks. The following observations update, and offer new insights, on BIP in 
Indonesia, and present data on recent developments in ITPL, India.  
 
Heightened Competition 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly facing strong mounting competition from 
competing parks within their vicinity. Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent 
Indonesian politicians, have mushroomed around BIP. Panbil Industrial Park, for instance, is 
located directly opposite BIP, and offers similar factories at competitive rentals. The premium 
placed on the Park’s one-stop support service, and self-sufficient operating environment, is 
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increasingly called into question. As well, competition is not limited to within Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s minimum wage, at US$43 to US$70 a month, depending on the region, prices it out 
of the global competition for cheap labor. Investors can get similarly-skilled labor from 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka at monthly wages of US$17, US$32, and US$40 
respectively. Recent press reports on Riau’s investor exodus 12  cite sluggish bureaucracy, 
`rowdy’ labor scenes, lack of legal certainty and security, and unclear investment policies as 
reasons for investors relocating their investments from Riau Province, and Indonesia. Populist 
measures such as raising the minimum wages before the general elections due in 2004, further 
heighten the reluctance of investors to pour money into the country. 
 
ITPL’s success hinges on the “Singapore-styled design and management” reputation. However, 
the premium placed on ITPL’s formulaic ‘one-stop’ service and self-sufficient infrastructure is 
similarly, and increasingly, eroded by intense competition from newer, albeit, smaller parks 
being developed by street-savvy Indian entrepreneurs, and ITPL’s capacity to provide stable 
electricity is the only differentiating factor from other IT parks like the Software Tech Park and 
Electronics City. These competitor paks market themselves aggressively on price, charging 
significantly lower rentals for “no-frills” factory space. A case in point, ITPL’s listed lease price 
is Rs50 (approximately US$1) per square foot, whereas the rate in other areas, and within 
Electronic City itself, just outside ITPL, is less than Rs15. Our interviews with IPTL tenants 
have alluded to the possibility that the Park’s attractiveness may, in time, be eroded, as more IT 
parks and companies are established within the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, while 
offering lower rentals with reliable energy, as the state develops. 
                                                 
12 The Straits Times, 30 August 2003, The Straits Times, December 5, 2003.. 
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Political ‘Commitment’ 
Reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) rather than transparent contracts has had 
advantages and disadvantages. For BIP, the reliance on the Salim Group has been necessary in 
the context of the Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ fostered by then President Soeharto. 
The end of the Soeharto era, and pressure from the IMF and western governments for financial 
transparency, has diminished Salim’s political and commercial influence. Ownership changes at 
BIP have brought about uncertainties13, as the Parks’ privileged access to senior politicians and 
policy-makers in Jakarta has proved more difficult. Compounding these uncertainties, inter-
governmental endorsements, post-Soeharto, no longer suffice to secure commitments at the 
lower tiers of government. Anecdotal evidence 14  points to a more complex regulatory 
environment for foreign companies, as they have to deal more intensively with the provincial and 
sub-provincial (district) governments. The Parks’ reputation as investment enclaves has also not 
been left unscathed by political developments in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the 
September 11 attacks in the United States, and more recently, the Bali and Jakarta-Merriot bomb 
blasts. In addition, negative press reports on active terrorist cells within the region serve little to 
quell the innate risk-aversion of potential investors. BIP could do without these added sentiments 
in its larger environment. 
 
                                                 
13 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the Salim Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – 
estimated to be worth S$500 million – in a packaged deal (The Business Times, August 28, 2001). Further restructuring have taken 
place, with the three main stakeholders now being SCI, Ascendas and the Indonesian government. 
 
14 Law No. 22/199 allows provincial, district and municipal governments to write provincial laws, some of which contradict national 
laws, or test the boundaries of their power. The Megawati administration is now proposing a revision of laws on regional autonomy, 
but the direction remains unclear. For a discussion on the problems with regional autonomy and their impact on business, see Van 
Zorge, Heffernan & Associates (April 2002). Interviews with BIP executives and tenants, in September 2002 and July 2003, 
respectively, have alluded to this changed operating environment. 
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In India, varying degrees of commitment and support by different state governments towards the 
country’s development can affect ITPL’s competitive advantage. The lack of good supporting 
infrastructure in the surrounding environment, and the disparity in local state-government 
supporting different cities, serve as a deterrent to investors, even as cities like Hyderabad, 
Mumbai and Chennai continue to advance technologically. On a broader front, corruption 
remains endemic, and bureaucratic red-tape is difficult to circumvent. These considerations are, 
by themselves, deterrence to potential investors, even with Singapore’s presence and 
involvement. To hedge Singapore’s strategic interests in India, Ascendas is reportedly partnering 
India’s largest construction conglomerate, Larsen and Toubro, to build Cyber Pearl in 
Hyderabad’s Hitec City, while plans are in place to develop similar IT parks in Chennai and 
other Indian cities, on a turnkey basis. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Singapore’s overseas parks tend to exist as investment enclaves within a disjointed economic and 
policy environment. They are linked to transnational investment networks, business elites and 
specific government commitments. The positive aspect of this is that the parks can be sites of 
investment privilege, in respect of their regulatory controls, infrastructure quality and status with 
public and private agencies. The weakness is that the privileges obtained are vulnerable to 
changes in political allegiances, and the infrastructure efficiency is at risk from the uncontrolled 
broader environment in which the park is located.  
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An outright assessment of failure or success may not be appropriate, given the mixed economic 
and political objectives 15 . However, our study suggests the economic theorization that 
underscores Singapore’s regionalization stratagem continues to be overshadowed by the policy 
nuances that radiate from the host environment. The calculated, schematized efforts at trans-
border industrialization, though remarkable, have been overly optimistic and have failed to 
engender equally compelling results, more often than not frustrated by the intricacies of socio-
political realities in the host economies. The limits to `Singapore Unlimited’ have been exposed 
in this chapter. 
 
                                                 
15 Sentiments at SembCorp Industries and Ascendas International remain optimistic, as is the willingness of senior management to 
search for alternative strategies to re-position these flagship projects. In our discussions, the Parks’ management reasons that 
competition is inevitable. And, rather than engaging in a price war, management has indicated a preference to adjust rates to ‘better 
reflect market situations’ while, at the same time, endeavor to differentiate the Parks from competitors by catering to higher value-
added activities. For instance, in BIP, there are plans to create new initiatives for the Parks’ tenants, such as offering broadband 
services ahead of competitors, and providing supply-chain management solutions for its tenants. Interestingly, the Parks’ 
management view competitors as essential components of a ‘living system in which all entities within the system constantly adapt to 
their dynamic environment and are synergistically integrated’. In the case of BIP, it is argued, co-existence must be established to 
augment a positive image of the Riau Islands as an investment haven, and competitors are viewed as an imperative to the long-term 
attractiveness of BIP. As well, Bintan Industrial Estate, in close geographical proximity to BIP, serves as a cheaper alternative for 
cost-conscious companies to locate their operational activities. In the case of ITPL, the project is perceived as a strategic thrust to 
capitalize upon first-mover advantages in a regional economy with immense market potential. ITPL, as the first entrant to 
successfully develop and manage a state-of-the-art technology park, has arguably enhanced Singapore’s reputation for industrial-
township projects. More subtly, ITPL’s apparent success may leverage Singaporean companies’ foray into India’s aggressive 
infrastructure plans and commercial-residential township projects. 
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TABLE 1 
Singapore’s Total Direct Investment Abroad by Destination 
Millions of S$, Stock as at Year-End 
 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics. 
 
 
 
Destination 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
China 11.5 13.8 16.1 15.4 16.3 
Malaysia 17.3 11.8 11.4 9.2 10.1 
Hong Kong 10.8 10.7 10.1 11.2 8.4 
United States 4.7 3.8 4.1 4.5 6.5 
Indonesia 7.0 8.6 5.9 5.9 5.8 
Mauritius 0.7 3.3 4.3 3.7 4.5 
British Virgin Islands 2.6 3.8 5.3 5.2 4.2 
Liberia 4.2 5.2 3.5 2.6 4.0 
Total (%) 58.8 61.0 60.6 57.8 59.6 
Total (S$m) 55,536 75,807 75,622 92,720 91,949 
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FIGURE 1 
Singapore’s Transborder Industrialization 
 
 
                     Source: Adapted from Singapore Unlimited (Singapore Economic Development Board, 
1995). 
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                                              TABLE 2A 
Batamindo Industrial Park - Operational Statistics (June 2003) 
                              
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Annual Export Value (for 
2002) 
    No. of Employees 
 
US$470 million 
82 
320 hectares 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
65,000 
 
 
                             Source: SembCorp Industries. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2B 
Batamindo Industrial Park – Tenant Profile by Country of Origin (June 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
 
USA 9 
Japan 48 
Europe 11 
Singapore 30 
 
            Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003 
 
                               
 
 
 
TABLE 2C 
Batamindo Industrial Park – Tenant Profile by Sector (June 2003) 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Electronics 44 Packaging  6 
Precision Parts 15 Medical 4 
Plastic moulding 11 Pharmaceuticals 1 
Electrical 11 Others 9 
 
  Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003 
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TABLE 3A 
  International Technology Park Limited - Operational Statistics (June 2003) 
 
General Information 
Scale of Development  
Developed Area 
Total Investment Value 
Confirmed Tenants 
Operating Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Park Population 
 
About 70 acres 
1.6 million sq ft 
SG$200 Million 
100 
 93 
1.4 million sq ft. 
8,500 
 
 
Source: Ascendas International.     
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3B 
International Technology Park Limited – Tenant Profile by Country of Origin (June 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
USA 42 
India 36 
Europe 16 
Asia 6 
 
        Source: Ascendas International.     
  
 
 
             TABLE 3C 
               International Technology Park Limited – Tenant Profile by Sector (June 2003) 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Software 
Development 49 IC Design 3 
BPO/ITES 24 R&D 1 
Biotech/Bio-
Informatics 3 
Educational 
Institutions 2 
Manufacturing 10 Others 8 
                                                                
Source: Ascendas International.     
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TABLE 4 
 
       Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in BIP/ITPL 
 
Popular Ranking  
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimates 
- Binary Logits 
 
BIP 
 
ITPL 
 
Variables 
 
α i p-value  Frequency
 
Rank
 
Frequency 
 
Rank 
 
Political commitment from 
Singapore government 
 
 
1.422 
 
 
0.237 
   
 
Political commitment from 
host country government 
1.992 0.058** 
   
Investment incentives 1.253 0.291 
   
Competitive labor costs 4.274 0.003*** 
 
   
Availability of 
skilled/educated labor -0.644 0.622 
 
   
Reliable infrastructure 
facilities -1.124 0.424 
   
   
 
 
17 
 
 
21 
 
 
16 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
 
14 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
2 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
1 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
          φ p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
      *** Significant at 10% level 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
  
 TABLE 5 
Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in BIP/ITPL 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
- Binary Logits 
 
Variables 
α i p-value 
                                                           
Labor Constraints   
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor 2.770 0.024** 
   
Shortage of professionals and managers -0.182 0.865 
   
Rising labor costs 2.283 0.021** 
   
Industrial relations problems 3.330 0.002*** 
   
Others 1.235 0.336 
   
   
Organizational/Technological Constraints   
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 1.246 0.226 
   
Difficulty in introducing new technology 
and techniques 2.541 0.009*** 
   
Lack of good supporting services 2.504 0.007*** 
   
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 1.699 0.135 
   
High and/or rising overhead costs 0.914 0.303 
   
Others -18.831 0.999 
   
   
Environmental Constraints   
Impact of host government regulations 2.312 0.018** 
   
Competition from overseas 
Competitors 2.920 0.001*** 
   
Others -2.705 0.084* 
   
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
          φ p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
      *** Significant at 10% level 
 
Source: Questionnaire Surveys. 
